Meta-Theoretical Considerations in Cormac McCarthy's "The Kekulé Problem"

This essay systematizes metatheoretical issues elicited by a structural notion found in the literature of complexity science and integral theory.[1] We can define the effective complexity (EC) of an entity as the length of a highly compressed description of its regularities.[2] Metatheoretical problems arise by virtue of EC being a condensed theoretical description of singled out properties and behavioral regularities of the scrutinized phenomenon. Insofar as analysis is theoretical any synthesized description of phenomena is subjectively bound. The conundrum scales exponentially when the phenomenon in question is considered embedded to an ecosystem. If an entity is embedded in a network or interconnected system whose ontology is process, complexity, nonlinearity, multidimensionality, and spectrality, then subjectivity plays a greater role in selecting what metatheory systematizes what theory in

order to carry out the analytical practice of the phenomenon under scrutiny. Moreover, the properties and behavioral regularities of the phenomenon under analysis are necessarily bound to naturalistic ontology while the description is nevertheless a separate phenomenon articulated qualitatively by mind. Thus, the naturalistic ontology presupposed metatheoretically by science fails to account for the subjective component of mind's role inasmuch as the ontology of mind is not necessarily naturalistic in kind.

Analysis per se is a qualitative phenomenon which suggests that articulating an entity's EC—or any property of a natural phenomenon deduced by way of nous—means the ontological properties of subjectivity have to be accounted for. Particularly, the metatheoretical issues that the unconscious introduces to any analytical practice means that the analyst conflates the mind/body distinction as a way around the problem. The unconscious is unaccounted in metatheoretical considerations of naturalism as ontology through willful ignorance. Can we speak of such a thing as a naturalism which takes the unconscious seriously? I try to put a step in that direction by systematizing the metatheoretical issues raised by the unconscious, and then by submitting two definitions of the unconscious to open up critical routes toward a responsible metatheory of analysis.

§1. The first metatheoretical problem of EC as it pertains to analysis is that a priori definitions of randomness and non-randomness reduce the scope of analysis in favor of pragmatism. The utility of complexifying a set of discernible variables endogenously ignores the exogenous entities at play. Therefore, it becomes theoretically impossible to condense a full description of an entity in any ontology given the endogenous nature of the selected model's scope. (A way around the problem is to widen the scope metatheoretically but that move introduces a host of issues worthy of a different paper.) Variables in the unconscious are defined as elements in unconsciousness which implies that any entity that is not visible to the selected framework is theoretically unaccounted for under the guise of randomness. On the other hand, the description becomes metatheoretically qualified as ontologically limited for theoretically it cannot synthesize all properties of the real under a single compressed EC. There does not seem to be as of yet a way around this problem, as a God's eye view of things—a gaze outside time with an EC of ∞ length—would be needed to distinguish exhaustibly the complexity of t0 conditions of any entity ecosystematically embedded to other entities. (We could suggest that it is not an obvious move to metatheoretically designate universal natures to entities which raises a set of issues surrounding what qualifies as random/non-random qualia, a topic for another paper.) Such a view would account for every entity, property, and behavioral regularities making it theoretically inclusive—this seems to be the end goal of integral theory—while not meta-theoretically suspect because it would not be ontologically limited—the metatheory behind an EC of ∞ length could synthesize all properties of the real under an all encompassing framework—this seems to be the end goal of science. Finally, the problem scales parasitically when considering sets of entities whose interactions become exponential. If the impossibility of full discernment applies to a single entity, it follows that any reading of complexity ex ante is partial and therefore limited when it comes to many entities. Does the same apply retroactively?

§2. If analysis is retrospective the unconscious a priori quality that directs the algorithm recollectively is the same as in §1 in a posteriori fashion. For this reason exhaustive genealogies are impossible to carry out because there is always something irreducible about analyzing the path from t1 to t0. As was the case from t0 to t1, epistemologically speaking, there is no way around the problem of the unconscious which means that analysis cannot reduce ex ante nor retroactively the complexity of t0 except artificially through a set of specified rules. If we abide the artificial status of our models we are effectively biting the bullet of the metatheoretical problem raised by §1 and §2. But there is a residual problem stemming from the first problem.

§3. Before an algorithm can be synthesized for analysis a set of structural propositions have to govern the picture of t0. Qualia enables propositionality so any theory is an a priori unconscious EC introduced by mind when it fixes a picture of t0.[3] The picture of t0 in natural conditions is subsumed by the unconscious which means analysis is structured meta-theoretically by the unconscious EC of mind beforehand. The EC of mind is the condensed description of the blueprint that interprets the real irrespective of a posteriori metatheoretical considerations learned through the process of retrospective experimentation with variegated pictures of t0.[4] This problem is similar to §1 and §2 but it adds another confounding layer, namely, the picture of t0 is artificially fixed in time by an unconscious metatheoretical framework that contours, and colors, the phenomenology of t0. What framework are we using if we cannot see it?

Perhaps we may never know what the unconscious is beside a metaphor of what we do not know. Regardless, metatheoretical responsibility resides on our thinking through how the unconscious could operate as part of a naturalistic ontology whose direction is ultimately metatheoretically integral. Can we tackle §1-3 by attempting a metatheory of the unconscious? Cormac McCarthy suggests an interesting answer in his article "The Kekulé Problem", namely, that the unconscious is a machine for operating animals, and that the unconscious favors the picture-story mode.

"Apart from its great antiquity the picture-story mode of presentation favored by the unconscious has the appeal of its simple utility. A picture can be recalled in its entirety whereas an essay cannot. Unless one is an Asperger’s case. In which event memories, while correct, suffer from their own literalness. The log of knowledge or information contained in the brain of the average citizen is enormous. But the form in which it resides is largely unknown. You may have read a thousand books and be able to discuss any one of them without remembering a word of the text."[5]

"The picture-story lends itself to parable. To the tale whose meaning gives one pause. The unconscious is concerned with rules but these rules will require your cooperation. The unconscious wants to give guidance to your life in general but it doesnt care what toothpaste you use. And while the path which it suggests for you may be broad it doesnt include going over a cliff. We can see this in dreams. Those disturbing dreams which wake us from sleep are purely graphic. No one speaks. These are very old dreams and often troubling. Sometimes a friend can see their meaning where we cannot. The unconscious intends that they be difficult to unravel because it wants us to think about them. To remember them. It doesnt say that you cant ask for help. Parables of course often want to resolve themselves into the pictorial. When you first heard of Plato’s cave you set about reconstructing it."[6]

To transpose McCarthy's thesis into the key of complexity science and integral theory the unconscious is the equivalent of God because its description involves an EC of ∞ length. From this master idea we can take different critical routes. First, the unconscious is a machine—a supernatural complex system?—that describes in the picture-story form the EC—evolutionary paths?—of the consciousness it speaks to so that mind can voluntarily choose to think through it and participate in it. Metatheoretically speaking, it can see non-lineal time and peer into the holoarchy. In Jean Gebser's parlance, the unconscious is the diaphanous light of the everpresent origin inasmuch as it is conscious of t0 non-artificially. The unconscious is thus the overseer of conscious experience, a friend preoccupied with the qualitative growth of consciousness. Another route is that the unconscious is similar to the genome. It is a complex, multidimensional, spectral, and non-lineal library of references whose end game is ineffable. The unconscious in this sense is the basis of consciousness, the result of the developmental process of mind which enables the emergence of higher developmental levels of consciousness.

To conclude, what the metatheoretical issues of EC raise as it pertains to analysis, is that subjectivity is necessarily a limitedness of circumference, not the length of a straight line. Circumference that represents subjectivity operating under structural—conscious and unconscious—qualia. What lies within the circumference is conscious, outside it, unconscious. The conscious thinking through of qualia can lead to metatheoretical responsibility when factoring into theory the unique role of the unconscious as both metaphor of what we do not know and as a concrete reality with unique modes of operation. It is undeniable that the unconscious lives in consciousness. We can ignore the reality of the unconscious through a naturalist ontology that disregards it—wherein consciousness accepts "artificial sight" as its only model of comprehension—or we can accept it as part and parcel of reality—and attempt new metatheories of consciousness that synthesizes nature with the ineffable the way an integral ontology would. Regardless, I hope this essay shows why it remains important to consider the metatheoretical significance of the unconscious in analytic practices, even if that means utilizing it not as an entity with its own nature but merely as a metaphor which illustrates that some things are always out of view.

Notes

[1] A metatheory or meta-theory is a theory whose subject matter is theory itself, aiming to describe existing theory in a systematic way. In mathematics and mathematical logic, a metatheory is a mathematical theory about another mathematical theory. Meta-theoretical investigations are part of the philosophy of science. A metatheory is not applied directly to practice, but may have applications to the practice of the field it studies. The emerging field of metascience seeks to use scientific knowledge to improve the practice of science itself. It attempts to place a wide diversity of theories and models into one single framework.

Complexity characterises the behavior of a system or model whose components interact in multiple ways and follow local rules, leading to nonlinearity, randomness, collective dynamics, hierarchy, and emergence. The term is generally used to characterize something with many parts where those parts interact with each other in multiple ways, culminating in a higher order of emergence greater than the sum of its parts. The study of these complex linkages at various scales is the main goal of complex systems theory. The intuitive criterion of complexity can be formulated as follows: a system would be more complex if more parts could be distinguished, and if more connections between them existed.

Integral theory is a synthetic metatheory developed by Ken Wilber. The basis is a "spectrum of consciousness," from archaic consciousness to ultimate spirit, presented as a developmental model. This model is based on development stages as described in structural developmental stage theories; various psychic and supernatural experiences; and models of spiritual development. In Wilber's later framework, the AQAL (All Quadrants All Levels) model, it is extended with a grid with four quadrants (interior-exterior, individual-collective), synthesizing various theories and models of individual psychological and spiritual development, of collective mutations of consciousness, and of levels or holons of neurological functioning and societal organisation, in a metatheory in which all academic disciplines and every form of knowledge and experience are supposed to fit together.

[2] Effective complexity is a measure of complexity defined in a 1996 paper by Murray Gell-Mann and Seth Lloyd that attempts to measure the amount of non-random information in a system. It has been criticised as being dependent on the subjective decisions made as to which parts of the information in the system are to be discounted as random.

[3] Metatheoretically speaking, the universal grammar of alphabets is the normative blueprint through which qualia is translated into intelligible form and it cooperates with EC's semantic blueprint to interpret the real into discernible and coherent reality. The unconscious is the result of the developmental process of mind which enables its functioning in higher developmental levels of consciousness (a topic worthy of exploration in a different text). Each particular developmental path of mind is participative inasmuch as its EC is an emergent pattern made up of t0s in complex process. It follows that each mind is significant and idiosyncratic within the holoarchy that make up EC of ∞ length. Simply put, every EC interprets polysemy differently. The condensed description of EC of ∞ length is captured by the image of a tapestry knit by interdependent entities eco-systematically embedded to an integral ontology.

[4] A posteriori metatheoretical considerations learned through the process of retrospective experimentation with variegated pictures of t0 is the methodological process of science.

[5] Cormac McCarthy, "The Kekulé Problem: Where did language come from?", Nautilus (April 17, 2017).

[6] Ibid.